Formal Authority

Formal Authority INTRODUCTION Authority is a defining feature of hierarchy. Authority in management is the formal or legitimate authority specified in a charter that gives a project manager the authority to act in the name of the sponsoring executive or on behalf of the organization. There are various types of authority according to different people. But they all seem to have a fundamental flaw that is they are unable to clearly distinguish between formal, informal authority and leadership. Formal authority is the authority provided by an organization or the law to an individual enabling him to carry out certain actions in accordance with his own will and without the need to consult others. Informal authority is the authority that the manager holds over his subordinates due to certain qualities that the subordinates value in him. A manager with good leadership skills has more informal authority as opposed to people with less leadership skills. It is a common perception that most organisations give formal authorit y to managers to direct and control the activities of their subordinates but this is not always true it depends on various other factors as well. One of the major factors that affect the type of authority given to managers is size of the organization usually smaller organizations have a system of authority whereas large organizations have a formal system of authority. FUNCTIONAL AUTHORITY Functional authority is authority delegated to an individual or department over specific activities undertaken by personnel in other departments. Staff managers may have functional authority, meaning that they can issue orders down the chain of command within the very narrow limits of their authority. For example, supervisors in a manufacturing plant may find that their immediate bosses have line authority over them, but that someone in corporate headquarters may also have line authority over some of their activities or decisions. Organizations create positions of functional authority to break the unity of command principle by having individuals report to two bosses. Functional authority allows specialization of skills and improved coordination. This concept was originally suggested by Frederick Taylor. He separated â€Å"planning†from â€Å"doing†by establishing a special department to relieve the labourer and the foreman from the work of planning. The role of the foreman became one of making sure that planned operations were carried out. The major problem of functional authority is overlapping relationships, which can be resolved by clearly designating to individuals which activities their immediate bosses have authority over and which activities are under the direction of someone else. THEORIES Fayol (1949) defined authority as the right to give orders and the power to extract obedience. He emphasised the importance of linking authority to responsibility, which together required increasing judgement and morality at senior levels. He justified higher pay for commercial managers in comparison with senior civil servants since, in his view, the latter exercised authority without responsibility. In general, he concluded that responsibility is feared as much as authority is sought after, and fear of responsibility paralyses much initiative and destroys many good qualities. FORMAL AUTHORITY IN A BANK Union National Bank in Abu Dhabi is an organization that exercises formal authority. As a manager in the bank i was provided with formal authority over a group of six employees and we were a part of the internal customer satisfaction survey department. One of the main reasons the bank believes in providing formal authority is so as to not concern people at higher positions with unimportant tasks. Another important aspect of formal authority is it reduces conflict among people in higher positions if still unable to completely remove it. The reason that there may still be conflicts is that though formal authority empowers managers to a certain degree the managers boss still has a say in the managers decision should he choose to. OVERVIEW OF UNION NATIONAL BANK Established as a Public Joint Stock Company in 1982, they are one of the leading domestic banks in the United Arab Emirates and are headquartered in Abu Dhabi. They offer a variety of products and services, addressing needs ranging from basic requirements of individuals to the more complex requirements of corporate entities. Electronic delivery channels, ably supported by an extensive network of Banking Centres spread across the emirates, offer greater banking convenience to their customers. They are the only bank that is jointly owned by the Governments of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Their Chairman, H. H. Sheikh Nahayan Mabarak Al Nahayan, Minister of Education and Scientific Research, is well supported by their Board of Directorsthat consists of eminent business personalities and their Senior Managementteam which is made up of experienced professionals. Their Vision and Missionis clearly defined and their business strategy is well understood by all staff across the bank. Union Brokerage Company (UBC), one of the oldest brokerage firms in UAE is a subsidiary of UNB. Besides being a leading player in the Brokerage industry, it was among the first national companies to deal in the brokerage field in the country. Besides its head office in Khalidiya, Abu Dhabi, it has a well diversified branch network with 6 other branches at ADX, DFM, Al Ain, Al Dhafra, Fujairah and Gold Diamond Park, Dubai. The Al Wifaq Finance Company, a subsidiary of UNB has been established with the purpose of offering Sharia compliant financial, commercial and investing services to both organizations and individuals in compliance with the rules and principals of the Islamic Law As partof the Banks vision, to be â€Å"a key player in the region†, UNB has now a presence in the Egyptian banking sector through itssuccessful acquisition of the Alexandria Commercial and Maritime Bank. UNB is also reviewing other geographic locations for a presence or strategic alliances that will add to shareholder value. PERSONAL EXPERIENCES ON FORMAL AUTHORITY Though formal authority is considered to be authority provided by the organization or superior to an individual it is more often implied than anything else. When employees had issues with anything to do with the customer satisfaction department i had the authority to decide what was to be done. This greatly reduced the time taken for certain tasks to be done. As i had the authority to take decisions on issues such as upgrading of equipment or changes in software and other issues i did not have to elevate it to my boss. This helped also as i could take a better decision as i had more interaction with employees and knew their needs. If these problems had to be elevated to the higher management these issues could have taken a much longer time frame to get resolved. Also managers at the upper levels especially while working in large organizations that have branches at various parts of a country or the world are unable to clearly see the needs of each branch. Providing formal authority en ables a more personalized approach between employees and the organization. Also individual employee needs are better recognized by their immediate managers rather than managers at the top. At the same time there were certain issues that i faced as when i decided to implement a change in the questionnaire on the request of several employees i found that the management wanted to stick to the older pattern. This shows that formal authority is not always clearly outlined in an organization. Managers are unencumbered by management theory and standards established by others. Effective managers want to be in charge; they also possess an intrinsic desire to achieve substantial personal recognition and to earn that recognition based on their own merits. They never abuse power; they know that the corrupt use of power creates a vile corporate poison that can quickly spread throughout an entire organization and paralyze it. They thus practise humility and refrain from using their position to intimidate others. They can define and manage each situation or person with an appropriate leadership style. Example-they tend to treat their vice-presidents and line workers with the same level of respect, but through different approaches. Authority is the defining feature of hierarchy. The boss can restrict the subordinates actions, overturn his decisions, and even fire him (unless the bosss boss objects, in which case the boss herself may be fired). Tracing this chain of authority up the hierarchy, we eventually reach a person (sole proprietor) or group (shareholders) who can be thought of as owning all the decision rights in the organization. In short, formal authority resides at the top. Leading is one of principal managerial functions. Managers are suppose to be formal leaders because they have the authority to influence their subordinates and are expected to use it. They are officially responsible for outcome of their group. However, in an organization, not all managers are leaders, whether they have direct reports or not. In certain cases job description might demand strong leadership, on other hand leadership might not be major factor. However, in todays competitive world, most of the managerial jobs demand leadership qualities, inter personal and inter group interaction and a manager has to manage different type of responsibilities and roles. A leader influences other member of groups, leads group, and directs members towards its goals. A leader influences s ubordinates level of motivation, their performance and quality of their decisions. DISADVANTAGES OF FORMAL AUTHORITY Authority is a wily beast. In general it means that people will abide by your decisions. They will do what you want them to do. no manager can be effective with merely formal authority. True power comes from the trusting relationships that one forges with the people around him. He does this by being genuinely interested, and helpful. He commands attention by making lucid, compelling points, and acting decisively and transparently. Formal authority will not inspire people to do their best work with a happy heart. The best one can hope for with merely formal authority is grudging or indifferent acquiescence. We can easily become enamored with the â€Å"power of our positions.† Having people do what we tell them to do when we tell them to do it can have an intoxicating effect. Under such circumstances, too often our senses become dulled and we become oblivious to the dangers of formal authority. When authority â€Å"goes to our heads,† it becomes much too easy to disregard , or overlook entirely, critical input we might otherwise receive from peers, superiors and even clients. CONCLUSION From this essay we can conclude that formal authority is like a two sided coin it has its ups and downs. Also formal authority depends a lot on the situation and the organization. Smaller organizations may find that formal authority does not suit them whereas larger organizations may find that formal authority is better suited for them. At the same time larger organizations that have strict rules on company policies may find that formal authority conflicts their objectives. Every manager is unique thus formal authority may be needed by some managers to perform well whereas managers with strong leadership qualities may be able to perform well even in the absence of formal authority as they naturally have the respect and support of employees. Formal authority can be thought of as the right to command or compel another person to perform a certain act. Power is the ability to influence or cause a person to perform an act. It is possible for a manager to have formal authority without powe r, just as it is possible for a subordinate to have power without formal authority. The distinction between these terms may be significant for the manager, who may assume that his formal authority automatically gives him power but overlook the fact that his subordinates also have power, at times greater than his own. The manager in such a situation can encounter difficult and frustrating experiences without knowing why. The conventional view of leadership, formal and informal, can be seen as a confused mixture of leadership and management. Leadership can be seen as an occasional act rather than an ongoing role, a bit like creativity. On this view there is no such thing as formal leadership. Being in an organizational position of authority over others makes you a manager, not a leader. To be a leader, you need to be able to convince people to willingly follow some new direction. This means that there is formal and informal management but only informal leadership. Most managers show s ome leadership. The conventional view is that executives show leadership in two ways. By using their powers of persuasion, they influence people who report to them to take actions they would not otherwise take. The second way executives show leadership, on this view, is by making decisions that move the organization in new directions. However, we are gradually moving away from this concept of leadership, one based on formal authority. It is becoming increasingly recognized that making such decisions should be considered managerial actions. Managers can only lead by persuading people to act differently, either directly or by example. REFERENCES Baron, David P. and David Besanko: Information, Control, and Organizational Structure, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1, Summer 1992, 237-76. Barro, Robert J. and Paul M. Romer, 1987, Ski-Lift Pricing with Applications to Labor and Other Markets, American Economic Review, 77, 875-90. Ibarra, Herminia, 1993, Network Centrality, Power, and Innovation Involvement: Determinants of Technical and Administrative Roles, Academy of Management Journal, 36, 471-501. Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling, 1992, Specific and General Knowledge, and Organizational Structure, in Lars Werin and Hans Wijkander eds. Contract Economics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 251-74. Laffont, Jean-Jacques: Analysis of Hidden Gaming in a Three-Level Hierarchy, Journal of Law, Economic and Organization, 6, Fall 1990, 301-324. Mankiw, N. Gregory, 1985, Small Menu Costs and Large Business Cycles: A Macroeconomic Model of Monopoly, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 529-39. Marschak, Jacob and Roy Radner, 1972, The Economic Theory of Teams, New Haven CT: Yale University Press. Milgrom, Paul and D. John Roberts, 1988, An Economic Approach to Influence Activities in Organizations, American Journal of Sociology, 94 (Supplement), S154-S179. Pfeffer, Jeffrey, 1981, Power in Organizations, Marshfield MA:Pitman.

In measure for measure,the characters of Angelo and Isabella are similar

In measure for measure there are two characters that at first glance seem to be from two different worlds but a closer analysis shows that they are actually very similar. This is the case with Angelo and Isabella. When we first meet Angelo we see a ruthless leader who enforces the law as severely as he can and Isabella is the complete opposite, she is a virtuous and chaste young woman who was ready to devote her life to God. Both Angelo and Isabella have strict moral views; they both exhibit pride and are guilty of self deception. In scene, when Isabella and Angelo first meet straight away we can distinguish the similarities between them. For example, Isabella uses the same language as Angelo and the two of them are able to finish each other's sentences indicating that they are on the same thinking level and that they are actually not that different as both knew what the other was intending on saying. Isabella like Angelo is denying her sexuality. Isabella uses religion as a repression of sexuality where as Angelo represses his sexuality by enforcing harsh rules in Vienna regarding fornification and does not allow himself to express any feelings openly. One could argue that both Angelo and Isabella are sexually frustrated. Isabella is a pure and chaste young woman who happens to be in a corrupted society and it could be argued that her decision to join the nunnery was a way of sexual control and that she does not trust herself in the society that she is in and needs restraint â€Å"but rather wishing a more strict restraint† (1:4,L3). Angelo is a puritan and as a puritan he has to be able to control his sexuality which is why he doesn't express he desires or emotions and this leads to characters describing him as â€Å"a man whose blood is very snow broth† and in his soliloquy Angelo can't describe what he is feeling towards Isabella because he was never able to speak out openly about sex, emotions, love etc. â€Å"What's this?† â€Å"What's this?† (2:2, L 164) .For both of these characters repressing their sexuality discourages the audience from identifying with them. Another similarity that Angelo and Isabella both share is that they are put in a sordid situation by the Duke. The Duke put Angelo in charge of power whilst he left knowing full well that Angelo is a man made out of steel and will enforce the strict laws and as a result Claudio was condemned for fornification by Angelo who led to Isabella pleading for his life. The Duke is the only character who could intervene but chose not to. Isabella and Angelo are both troubled characters struggling to come to terms with their own inner nature. Both characters share their feelings and thoughts with he audience in soliloquy. Angelo (2:2) and Isabella (2:4) this is the only time that the audience can begin to understand these characters more and are able to empathise with them. One could argue that another feature both of these characters share is hypocrisy Angelo is an authoritive figure but does not practice what he preaches. He is a hypocritical character because he is condemning Claudio for fornification whilst going against his own law by asking Isabella to sleep with him.Similarly, Isabella readiness to give away another person's chastity (Marianna) is quite hypocritical because she refused to give up her own chastity because it was not morally right but was quite eager for Marianna to give up hers. It could also be argued that both Angelo and Isabella are selfish characters. Angelo's selfishness is evident in the way he abandoned Marianna due a lack of dowry and Isabella's selfishness is evident in the way she was prepared to value her own virginity more than her brother's life and the fact that she wanted Marinna to give up her virginity could also be seen as a selfish act. Both Isabella and Angelo are proud characters. Angelo is a proud man because he will not back down from enforcing the severe laws in Vienna even when Isabella pleads with him to spare her brother's life. I think Angelo feels that if he backs down then people will begin to take advantage of him as they did with the Duke so I think he feels it's imperative to be proud and honourable because that is the only way people will know you mean business and will look up to you. Isabella is a proud character in the sense that she would rather her brother lost his life rather than her give up her virginity to save him. To Isabella honour and pride means more than saving her own flesh and blood. â€Å"Die, perish†¦.not words to save thee† In conclusion, many critics have noted the similarity between Isabella and Angelo D.L Stevenson in his book, The Achievements of Measure for Measure, Ithaca 1966 notes the similarities between Angelo and Isabella, He claims ‘She is kind of observe of Angelo†¦ the play is only allowed to come to an end only at the moment of exact equivalence between Isabella and Angelo. It only ends s when Isabella has really become the thing she has argued for in Act II, merciful' (against all sense† the duke points out). What D.L Stevenson is arguing here is that in a sense Isabella looked up to Angelo because he was this authorative male figure but Isabella is also a strong female who was able to withstand pressure from this authoritive male figure. I agree with D.L Stevenson, I think that Isabella does look up to Angelo because he is a proud, authoritive being and I think in a way Isabella actually see a bit of herself in Angelo in the sense that neither of them can express themselves sexually as freely as they would have liked to therefore they resort to extreme situations to avoid confronting their true inner selves. They are both proud yet hypocritical characters who don't see any wrong in their own actions but are quick to blame others, for Isabella a prime example is when Claudio asked her to give up her virginity and she was outraged by what he suggested â€Å"O you beast!, O faithless coward!, O, dishonest wretch!† but yet she expected Marianna to do the exact thing she refused to do.

PSCs in Trinidad and Tobago for the development of petroluem resources - Free Essay Example

Sample details Pages: 10 Words: 2955 Downloads: 3 Date added: 2017/06/26 Category Economics Essay Type Research paper Did you like this example? DEDUCTION OF GRADES FOR PENALTIES: LATE SUBMISSION/PLAGIARISM ETC. (office staff only) Table of Contents Abstract Word Count Table of Abbreviations Table of Figures. 1Introduction 2Investor State Relationships: An Outline.. Don’t waste time! Our writers will create an original "PSCs in Trinidad and Tobago for the development of petroluem resources" essay for you Create order 2.1Types of Contracts: An Overview 2.2Investor State Relations in Trinidad and Tobago 3The Local Content Policy: Impact on the PSCs in Trinidad and Tobago 3.1Overview of Local content in Trinidad and Tobago. 3.2Comparison of terms in the Model PSCs 2000 and 2012 3.3The Effect of the Local Content Provisions in the PSC 4The Future of Investor-State Relations in Trinidad and Tobago.. 4.1How will Local Content Shape Investor-State Relations by 2020? 4.2Is There a Need for a Change in the Agreements? 5Conclusions 6List of References. Abstract Word Count ABSTRACT:Trinidad and Tobago has been involved in oil and gas exploration and production for over a century allowing it to become a global stalwart in the industry. Since conception, the country has employed various methods for governing investor-state relationships within the sector, with the most popular being the Production Sharing Contract (PSC) currently in use for over 35 years. This paper examines the use of PSCs in Trinidad and Tobago for the development of petroleum resources. It will explore the historic journey of the terms and conditions that the international investor is required to abide by under the PSC and the change of the structure of those terms with respect to the implementation of the Local Content and Local Participation Policy and Framework for the Energy Sector of Trinidad and Tobago. It will conclude with an analysis of the PSC and determine if it is still the best method for awarding rights in Trinidad and Tobago in light of the new legislation. WORD CO UNT:2221 Table of Abbreviations EP Exploration and Production GDP Gross Domestic Product GORTT Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago IOC/FOC International/Foreign Oil Company LCP Local Content and Local Participation Policy and Framework for the Energy Sector of Trinidad and Tobago MEEA Ministry of Energy and Energy Affairs NGC National Gas Company of Trinidad and Tobago Limited NOC National Oil Company Petroleum Act Petroleum Act and Petroleum Regulation (1969) 62:01 PSC Production Sharing Contract TT Trinidad and Tobago UTT University of Trinidad and Tobago Table of Figures Figure 1: Comparison of Different Types of Investor-State Contracts for Petroleum Development 8 Figure 2 Comparison of Terms and Conditions in the 2000 and 2012 Model PSCs in Trinidad and Tobago 10 Figure 3: Comparison of Trinidad and Tobagos Labour Force Distribution in 2000 and 2012 11 1 Introduction For over a century, Trinidad and Tobago (TT) has been involved in the Exploration and Production (EP) of petroleum resources. In 1993, the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (GORTT) established Petrotrin[1] charged with the consolidation and operations of petroleum production, refinement and asset marketing of the previous state-run enterprises (Petrotrin, 2012). In addition to the success of its oil endeavours, TT has also been prosperous in its gas initiatives, promoting the industrialization of gas in 1953 and incorporating the National Gas Company of Trinidad and Tobago Limited (NGC) in 1975. During the 1900à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢s, TT utilized EP Licenses for international investment activity in the petroleum sector. The GORTT, subsequently established the Petroleum Act and Petroleum Regulations 62.01 (1969) (Petroleum Act) to govern the activities of industry. Due to the rapid increase of oil production and the improvements to the administrative functions, TT iss ued its first Production Sharing Contract (PSC) in 1974. In 2004, the GORTT implemented the Local Content and Local Participation Policy and Framework for the Energy Sector of Trinidad and Tobago (LCP). The aim of the policy is to improve sustainable development in TT by ensuring that the citizens of the country are equipped and able to participate in the sector responsible for over 40% of annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 80% of exports. Currently, the sector employs just over 5% of the labour force (Ministry of Finance and the Economy, 2013). This paper examines the effect of the LCP on the terms and conditions within PSCs issued to International Oil Companies (IOC) in TT for the development of petroleum resources. Chapter 2 contains a brief overview of the different types of contracts and the history of investor state relations in TT. The LCP is evaluated in Chapter 3 along with a comparison of terms in the PSC that have been affected due to the implementation of the policy and its impact on the country. Chapter 4 provides an assessment of the outlook for TTà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢s investor relations and determines if there should be a change in the main contract type to facilitate the LCP. 2 Investor State Relationships: An Outline 2.1 Types of Contracts: An Overview To reap the benefits of the petroleum sector resource rich nations often rely on international companies to conduct EP activities as they are more experienced and have access to more capital funding. They have developed a symbiotic relationship, as host countries and IOCs depend on each other to obtain income. The negative consequences of allowing foreign companies to develop local resources, such as exploitation and pollution, have led to the development of contracts to govern the relationship (Katz, 1992). There are four main types of contracts currently in use today. These are the PSCs, concessions, risk service agreements and joint ventures. An overview of these contracts is presented in Figure 1. 2.2 Investor State Relations in Trinidad and Tobago In TT, EP licences[2] were originally issued during the 1900à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢s allowing the country to gain income through royalties (10%-12.5%) and taxes. The GORTT subsequently developed the Petroleum Act in 1969, which currently serves as the main legislation governing EP activities in the energy sector. In the 1970à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢s the GORTT discovered that EP licenses were inefficiently monetizing the countryà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢s energy resources. This resulted in the issue of the first PSC in 1974 based on the Indonesian model. During the 1980à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢s the petroleum fields issued under the concessions began approaching maturity, leading to the introduction of sub-licenses such as farm-out agreements to encourage lower cost production. This led to the decrease in the popularity of the licences and in 1990 PSCs became the main type of investor-state agreement governing EP activities in TT. The model for the PSC has been modified twice since its first issuance, during the 1995/1996 fiscal period and again in 2010. In addition to the change in structure, the terms and conditions within the PSCs have also been altered and updated since first issuance in an attempt to justly distribute benefits and risks between the GORTT and the IOC. These changes were due mainly to the volatility in the market and changes in legislation affecting the energy sector. In TT, a private investor is required apply to the Ministry of Energy and Energy Affairs (MEEA) to conduct any type of EP activity within the borders of the country. Currently, an investor can be offered one of four types of agreements (GORTT, 2012): Exploration (Public Petroleum Rights) Licence grants the licensee the non-exclusive right to carry out the petroleum operations provided by the licence. Exploration and Production (Public Petroleum Rights) Licence grants the licensee the exclusive right to explore for, produce and dispose of petroleum in accordance with the terms of the licence. Exploration and Production (Private Petroleum Rights) Licence PSC conduct of petroleum operations relating to the operations relating to the exploration, production and disposition of petroleum within a prescribed area. According to the Petroleum Act, the award of a PSC in TT involves a bidding process which requires, the payment of a pre-bid application fee and a full examination of the most recent model PSC. Bidders are also obligated to make an oral presentation demonstrating their technical and operational competence. The successful bidder is awarded a PSC based on the model examined. Where a discovery is not achieved within nine years of being awarded the contract, it will automatically be terminated. If, on the other hand, a discovery is made, the contract will be extended for a minimum of thirty years. 3 The Local Content Policy: Impact on the PSCs in Trinidad and Tobago 3.1 Overview of Local content in Trinidad and Tobago The LCP aims to promote sustainability by utilizing the capabilities of international companies to build local businesses, people, technology and capital markets (GORTT, 2004) via fiscal[3] and non-fiscal[4] methods. The traditional concept of à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã…“giving preferenceà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚  to local suppliers based on internationally comparable cost, quality and timeliness of delivery has not improved TTà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢s stance as only a globally competitive firm succeeds (GORTT, 2004) . Therefore, the LCP aims to promote local ownership, control and decision making, as well as local preferential project financing. This is in addition to the adequate and appropriate training of the local labour force to prevent IOCs from employing foreign personnel where the local market is able to satisfy the requirements. The policy also aims to take advantage of the countryà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢s small population of approximately 1.3 million people (Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago, 2012) and create a diverse and well trained labour force. This policy requires IOCs to give preferential treatment to local suppliers and enterprises by guaranteeing that they are given assertions from the principal operator which relate to access, treatment and re-imbursement for goods and services actually provided. The IOC is also required to address barriers that are currently preventing this from happening. 3.2 Comparison of terms in the Model PSCs 2000 and 2012 Due to the implementation of the LCP, the MEEA has updated the terms and conditions of the PSC to better reflect the objectives of the GORTT. Figure 2 provides a synopsis of the terms and conditions in both the 2000 (MEEA, 2000) and the 2012 (MEEA, 2012) model contract for Deep Water Blocks off the coast of Trinidad with regard to local content. 3.3 The Effect of the Local Content Provisions in the PSC Based on the comparison of the terms and conditions in the model PSCs (Figure 2), it is clear that since the policy implementation, there have been positive changes affect the local landscape. The 2000 Model failed to adequately provide for local development mentioning local content requirements 75% less than the 2012 Model. The shift into a more stringent and detailed PSC with regard to local content, holds the IOC and by extension the energy sector responsible for the development of the local labour force. It acts as a mechanism by which the GORTT protects its citizens from the adverse repercussions of FDI and reduces the instances of repatriation of funds (Global Business Reports, 2012). Figure 3 shows a comparison of the labour force contribution to the energy sector in 2000 and 2012. In 2012 the energy sector represented 5.4%[5] of the total labour force in TT increasing from 3.3% in 2000. The graph therefore insinuates that since the adoption of the LCP and the new terms and conditions in the PSC, more local labour has been geared towards the energy service sector for upstream, midstream and downstream activities. The 2012 Model not only helps the local labour force through employment and training and development opportunities, but also helps nurture the entrepreneurial[6] spirit by allowing small business owners to participate and reap the benefits of the countryà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢s largest sector. The provisions in the 2012 Model also attempt to reduce the imports and promote local manufacturing to control the trade balance and improve the current and capital accounts of the country. Despite the introduction of the policy and the changes to the new PSCs, several IOCs are still operating in TT under long-term pre-2004 contracts. This means that it may take several years before any substantial changes are seen in the sector with regard to the labour force and import reduction. 4 The Future of Investor-State Relations in Trinidad and Tobago 4.1 How will Local Content Shape Investor-State Relations by 2020? The GORTT (2012) suggests that the initiatives imposed on the IOCs via the shift in terms and conditions in the 2012 Model PSC will contribute to a significantly higher percentage of skilled, local personnel employed within the energy sector of TT by 2020. The MEEA (2013) has indicated that the intention of the LCP is not for IOCà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢s to be solely responsible for the progress of the local labour force and development of the economy, but rather to improve the working relationship between the GORTT and the IOCs. Since the policy was implemented, the GORTT has embarked on several projects aimed at assisting the IOCs with a labour force comparable to international standards. One of these projects was the establishment of the University of Trinidad and Tobago (UTT) which aids in the education of nationals with regard to petroleum development and other useful energy related subjects. It is plausible that this assistance in providing an educated workforce will maintain and i mprove the status of the investor-state relationships by 2020. The IOCs may initially resist the local content requirements especially where they have pre-2004 contracts with the GORTT. It is suggested, however, that they will ultimately abide as they require the resources of TT for income generation allowing a negotiation advantage which will ensure better treatment of the labour force (MEEA, 2013). Additionally, more countries are employing the use of local content policies, resulting in IOCs themselves highlighting plans for local content projects in the country during the bid round process. The adaptability of the IOC will also promote its standing in the country and compliance with the new PSC Model will allow them participate actively in future bid rounds held by the MEEA and GORTT. 4.2 Is There a Need for a Change in the Agreements? TT already offers other forms of investor-state contracts, such as the concession, although in lesser quantities than the PSC. Based on the PSC developments in TTà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢s 2012 Model, it appears that the GORTT and the MEEA are able to implement the requirements of the LCP effectively. This is clearly shown by the introduction of Article 39 in the 2012 Model which deals specifically and solely with local content and the investor. This means that there is currently no need for a shift in the main contract type used to govern investor-state relationships. The current PSC model successfully merges the requirement for an improved energy labour force and the incentives for foreign investors while not infringing on the sovereign right of IOCs. Considering that it has been less than a decade since the implementation of the LCP, it may be several years before the changes and benefits are observed in TT on a large scale. Therefore, the introduction of a new contract type may act ually dampen relationships with existing and potential investors. It is not recommended that TT change its main method of petroleum contracts to comply with LCP initiatives as the current methods employed will potentially see an increase in the local labour force participation in the energy sector within the next decade. 5 Conclusions In the energy world, there a various types of investor-state contracts that govern the relationship between a host country and an IOC. TT has been actively involved in oil and gas production for over a century, making them a substantial force in the Western Hemisphere. Since conception, IOCs have entered the country for EP activities under a variety of agreements with the PSC being the most popular. The citizens of the country, however, were placed in a disadvantageous position as the IOCs brought their own employees and imported goods and services from international companies rather than local firms. To protect the residents, the GORTT introduced the LCP in 2004 that would govern the activities in the local energy sector. The true extent of this policy was seen via an examination of the terms and conditions of the PSCs between 2000 and 2012. This paper highlighted the fact that the LCP allowed an update of the PSC model that better reflects the objectives of the GORTT with rega rd to local content. While several IOCs are still under contracts that do not include these changes, the energy sector will observe future improvement in local participation as new contracts are awarded. Based on the differences in the 2000 and 2012 Model PSCs, it is obvious that the GORTT have improved the terms and conditions to better reflect the implementation of the LCP. As a result of this, the recommendation is that TT maintain its main form of investor-state contract as the new terms will eventually benefit the citizens of the country in the form of improved labour and marketability as new contracts are awarded. 6 List of References Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago. (2012). Annual Report 2012. Port-of-Spain: Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobgao Limited. Global Business Reports. (2012). Trinidad and Tobagos oil and gas Industry. Oil and Gas Investigator. GORTT. (2004). Local Content and Local Participation Policy and Framework for the Energy Sector of Trinidad and Tobago. Port-of-Spain: Government Printery. GORTT. (2012). Current Fiscal Measure for the Upstream Petroleum Sector. Retrieved from Minstry of Energy and Energy Affairs: https://www.energy.gov.tt/investors.php?mid=159 Katz, S. B. (1992). Types of International Petroleum Contracts: Their History and Development. In R. Steinmetz, The Business of Petroleum Exploration (pp. 297-323). MEEA. (2000). Model Production Sharing Contract (2000). Port-of-Spain: Government Printery. MEEA. (2012). Model Production Sharing Contract (2012). Port-of-Spain: Government Printery. MEEA. (2013). Energy Policies. Retrieved from Ministry of Energy and Energy Affairs: https://www.energy.gov.tt/investors.php?mid=34 Ministry of Finance and the Economy. (2013). Review of the Economy. Petrotrin. (2012). About Us. Retrieved from Petroleum Company of Trinidad and Tobago: https://www.petrotrin.com/Petrotrin2007/AboutUs.htm [1] The state-owned oil company [2] Also referred to as concessionary agreements [3] Taxation and royalty policies as well as government expenditure to build capabilities [4] Promotion of Local Content, Local Participation and Local Capability Development [5] This is approximately 33,426 people employed in the energy sector in 2012 compared with 20,582 people in 2000. [6] Figure 3 shows a 4.8% increase in entrepreneurial activity.

Analysis of Keepern Me by Richard Wangamese Free Essay Example, 1250 words

Stanley gives Garnet details on who he is and narrates the account of events that took place twenty years ago. In the letter, Stanley invites Garnet to reunite with other family members at the reserve. On getting to the reserve, Garnet finds it difficult to fit into the society. He then meets Keeper, who understands his situation and is willing to help him. Keeper welcomes Garnet and takes him through the path to self-understanding and self-identity. Keeper also teaches Garnet the culture and lifestyle of the people within the reserve. These efforts by Keeper pay off, as Garnet gains insight into who he is and is able to live in the reserve comfortably. This book is in use by many scholars and is in the curriculum of some institutions of higher learning for literature studies. The theme of the novel is identifying oneself. The main character of the novel, Garnet Raven, is a person who is unable to understand his life and is keen to hide his identity. He tries to hide his Indian iden tity by associating himself with Mexicans, Blacks, and Asians. We will write a custom essay sample on Analysis of Keeper'n Me by Richard Wangamese or any topic specifically for you Only $17.96 $11.86/page